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1 Introduction
Investments and policies having long term impacts are crucial for the development of the
economy, and they often attract much attention in the public debate. One prominent ex-
ample are of course mitigation policies aimed at preventing dramatic future climate change
that may threaten the mere survival of many species, including humankind. The issue of
climate policy has recently revealed that there is no agreement among economists about the
appropriate welfare framework for evaluating such policies. The Stern review on the eco-
nomics of climate change Stern (2006) has been heatedly debated on this ground (Nordhaus,
2007a,b; Weitzman, 2007; Dasgupta, 2008; Heal, 2007).
Although they reach very different conclusions, all these papers endorse the same basic
welfare model, namely the Expected Discounted Utilitarian criterion
∞∑
t=0
e−δtEu(ct), (1)
where ct is, to simplify, the consumption of the representative agent of generation t. This
criterion yields the standard Ramsey equation (Ramsey, 1928): An investment from period
0 to period t that yields a sure rate of return r∗ is worth doing, in the margin, if
u′ (c0) < e
−δtEu′(ct)× e
r∗t,
i.e., if
r∗ > δ −
1
t
ln
(
Eu′(ct)
u′ (c0)
)
. (2)
The debate around this welfare model has been mostly confined to a discussion of the
parameters involved in Equation (2), in particular the rate of pure time preference δ and the
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. One can roughly identify two positions:
the ‘ethical’ or ‘prescriptive’ approach that recommends that ethical considerations should
guide the choice of the parameters, and the descriptive approach arguing that the parameters
should be chosen to match observed market rates. In the end, the choice between the two
approaches is an ethical choice, in the sense that a normative justification of the welfare
evaluation framework is called for.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.15
discounting, risk and inequality 2
Another issue has recently arisen, that seems to call into question the expected utility
framework used in Equation (1), namely the question of catastrophic risks. In an influen-
tial paper, Weitzman (2009) has indeed presented a ‘dismal theorem’ conveying the idea
that in the presence of catastrophic fat-tail risks, any investment for the future should be
undertaken, whatever the value of the parameters of the Ramsey equation. More precisely,
Weitzman shows that the threshold r∗ in Equation (2) can then become infinitely negative.
This conclusion has been much discussed (see Millner, 2013, for a recent discussion of the
debates surrounding Weitzman’s result).
The result by Weitzman (2009) is however representative of the profuse literature dis-
cussing the impact of risk on the social discount rate. In particular, it has been showed
that the social discount rate is likely to be lower when there is a large risk on future growth
(Weitzman, 1998; Gollier, 2002; Gollier and Weitzman, 2010). This kind of risk generally
induces the ‘Weitzman effect’ (Weitzman, 1998) that the social discount rate should decrease
with the time horizon. Another kind of risk is that on the rate of return of the investment.
It generally yields the opposite ‘Gollier effect’ (Gollier, 2004) that the social discount rate
increases with the time horizon. In general, both kind of risks co-exist, and they should be
jointly studied (Gollier, 2012, contains a chapter on the issue but restricts attention to the
discounted utilitarian approach).
In addition to risk, equity is another dimension that affects the social discount rate, even
in the standard discounted utilitarian framework. The usual technique to deal with equity
considerations in the literature on climate change policy has been to introduce equity weights
putting greater emphasis on the damages affecting the poor than to damages affecting the
rich. Early references include Azar and Sterner (1996), Azar (1999), Fankhauser Tol and
Pearce (1997) and Pearce (2003), and reach ambiguous conclusions regarding the impact of
equity considerations on the cost of carbon. Anthoff Hepburn and Tol (2009) is perhaps the
more recent and complete study, and they find that equity considerations can significantly
increase the social cost of carbon. These approaches do not directly incorporate equity
considerations in the discount rate. Gollier (2010) is an attempt in that direction, which
shows that equity considerations may yield an increase of the discount rate in the long run,
when there is economic convergence, or even when inequalities are persistent. The paper
however considers discount rates associated with a Utilitarian formula, where the costs and
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benefits of the investment are equally shared within generations. We want to consider a
more general case allowing unequal sharing of the costs and benefits, and not restricted to
the Utilitarian approach.
To sum up, the literature has identified some of the limitations of the basic welfare model
used to derive social discounting. Several shortcomings however remain. First, the analysis
is almost always confined to the standard Expected Discounted Utilitarian Model. The ex-
ceptions are papers considering non-expected utility models (Gollier, 2002, 2012; Gierlinger
and Gollier, 2008; Traeger, 2009) and a few papers suggesting alternatives to Utilitarianism
(Bommier and Zuber, 2008; Fleurbaey and Zuber, 2014; Zuber and Asheim, 2012). The
papers abandoning the expected utility framework studied the impact of ambiguity aversion
or preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty on the discount rate (Gollier,
2002, 2012; Gierlinger and Gollier, 2008; Traeger, 2009). In the present paper, we shall stick
to the expected utility framework. The papers introducing alernative social welfare criteria
generally limit themselves to some aspects of the risk, mainly the risk on the planning hori-
zon. It is indeed a second shortcoming of the literature that the different issues (systematic
risk, uncertainty of the returns, inequality) are treated separately. A last limitation of the
literature is that it usually considers successive generations, often represented by a single
agents, rather than considering overlapping generations.
In the present paper, we offer a general welfare framework to analyze the issues of risk,
inequality, and variable population. Our analysis does not focus on a particular criterion but
uncovers common features of all approaches. We allow both for a systematic risk that affects
aggregate consumption and a risk on the returns of the policy, examining how their inter-
actions affect social discounting. The main results of the paper are the following. First, we
obtain general formulas for the discount rate, which decompose the main components related
to growth, inequalities, and risks in consumption and in investment returns. Compared to
the classical Ramsey formula, these formulas display important additional covariance terms.
Second, we show that in the long run the key determinants of the discount rate are the situ-
ation of the worst-off individuals in the worst-case scenarios, as well as the maximum return
on the investment. The third main lesson is that, in an OLG setting, the discount rate is a
weighted average of market rates (individuals’ own discount rates) and the social discount
rate between different generations, implying that market rates are relevant for short-term
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investments but much less so in the long-run.
The difficult issues raised by the climate change problem also point to the limitations
of the social discount rate. When there is a risk of an early extinction of the humanity,
it is clear that the impacts of a policy on future consumption are not the only ones to be
considered, and perhaps not the most important ones. The effects of the policy on the
prospect of a catastrophe are also a key element, and we need tools to value changes in the
probability of catastrophic events. These issues are discussed at the end of the paper.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general setting and proposes a
definition of the social discount rate . Section 3 discusses how three aspects of the risk, the
systematic risk on aggregate consumption, the risk on returns and the risk on the planning
horizon, affect the social discount rate. Sections 4 tackles the issue of intra-generational
inequalities in consumption and the distribution of costs and benefits. Section 5 derives
an approximation formula for the social discount rate in the long run, showing that the
key figures are the maximum return of the investment and the maximum net return for a
poor-to-poor investment. Section 6 provides further extensions. First it considers an OLG
economy where individuals live for several periods and shows how individuals’ own discount
rates enter the general formula for social discounting. Second it discusses the limitations of
the social discount rate, in particular when policies affect the prospect of future catastrophes.
2 A general framework and the definition of the social discount rate
2.1 The framework
We let N0 denote the set of non-negative integers, N the set of positive integers, R the set
of real numbers, and R+ the set of non-negative real numbers. For a set X and any n ∈ N,
Xn is the n-fold Cartesian product of X.
We focus on evaluating distributions of consumption (or income) at the individual level
across periods. An alternative c is a collection of consumption levels, one for each individual
alive in the alternative. The set of potential individuals is N, so that alternatives are elements
of C =
⋃
N⊂N\∅
∏
i∈N R+. We therefore consider a variable-population framework, in which
the size of the population may vary from one alternative to another, depending on the subset
of individuals alive in the alternative. For any c ∈ C, we let N(c) be the set of individuals
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alive in the alternative and n(c) = |N (c)| be the number of individuals in the alternative.
We also need to know to which generation the people alive in an alternative belong. To
do so, we assume that there exists a partition of N into subsets N t containing the potential
individuals of generation t ∈ N0. Hence, for each potential individual i ∈ N, there exists a
unique t ∈ N0 such that i ∈ N
t, meaning that individual i belongs to generation t. We will
restrict attention to C = {c ∈ C | N0 ⊂ N(c)}, which means that all the members of the
current generation are present in all the alternatives we consider. For any c ∈ C and any
t ∈ N0, we denote N
t(c) = N t ∩N(c) and nt(c) = |N t(c)|.
Uncertainty is described by m ∈ N \ {1} states of the world. The set of states of the
world is S = {1, · · · ,m}. A prospect is a vector belonging to the set C = Cm with typical
element c = (c1, · · · , cm). For a prospect c, c
i
s denotes the consumption of individual i in
state of the world s, whenever i ∈ N(cs). To ease the exposition, when there is no ambiguity,
we use the notation Ns = N(cs), ns = n(cs), N
t
s = N
t(cs) and n
t
s = n
t(cs) for c ∈ C and
s ∈ S.
Let P =
{
(p1, · · · , pm) ∈ [0, 1]
m |
∑m
s=1 ps = 1
}
denotes the closed (m− 1)-simplex. A
lottery is the combination of a probability vector p = (p1, · · · , pm) ∈ P with a prospect
c = (c1, · · · , cm) ∈ C. The set of lotteries is denoted
L =
{
(p, c) ∈ P×C
}
.
2.2 The social evaluation function
A social evaluation function F is a function F : L → R used to ranked lotteries. For any
(p, c), (p′, c′) ∈ L, F (p, c) ≥ F (p′, c′) means that the lottery (p, c) is deemed socially at
least as good as the lottery (p′, c′). We assume that the social evaluation function is an
expected utility so that there exists a function W : C → R such that:
F (p, c) =
m∑
s=1
psW (cs). (3)
Although we will mostly work with this general function, it will be useful to illustrate
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our results with a few more specific examples. When
W (cs) =
∑
i∈Ns
u(cis), (4)
we obtain the usual Total Utilitarian criterion. The criterion has been criticized for yielding
the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit, 1984) where, for any population with excellent lives,
there is a population with lives barely worth living that is better, provided that the latter
includes sufficiently many people.
Several authors (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984; Broome, 2004; Blackorby Bossert and
Donaldson, 2005) have therefore proposed to use the Critical-Level Utilitarian criterion
W (cs) =
∑
i∈Ns
(
u(cis)− u¯
)
, (5)
where u¯ is the critical-level of utility. If u¯ = 01, we are back to the Total Utilitarian case,
but if u¯ > 0 only lives with a high enough welfare level are worth adding to a population.
One problem when u¯ > 0 is that we get the Very Sadistic Conclusion (Arrhenius, 2012)
where, for any population with terrible lives not worth living, there is a population with
good lives that is worse, provided that the latter includes sufficiently many people.
Yet another form is the Equally Distributed Equivalent (Fleurbaey, 2010), which can
take the form:
W (cs) = φ
−1
(
1
ns
∑
i∈Ns
φ
(
u(cis)
))
, (6)
where φ is an increasing and (weakly) concave function. When φ is affine, we obtain the Av-
erage Utilitarian Criterion, which does not satisfy the Negative Expansion Principle (Black-
orby Bossert and Donaldson, 2005) that adding a life not worth living should decrease the
value of a population. This is true of all Equally Distributed Equivalent evaluation functions
whenever φ(0) = 0.
More generally, one may want to consider the following class of generalized additive social
1u = 0 is known as the neutral utility level such that a life with higher welfare is worth living and a life
with lower welfare is not.
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evaluations functions:
W (cs) = Ψns
(∑
i∈Ns
φ
(
u(cis)
))
. (7)
Although this last formulation is highly general, the purpose of this paper is not to endorse
a specific social evaluation function. Several different forms have been proposed in the
literature (see for instance: Ng, 1989; Hurka, 2000; Bommier and Zuber, 2008; Asheim and
Zuber, 2014), and they all have normative drawbacks in terms of population ethics or social
risk evaluation. Our purpose is to show a common structure of the discount rate for all
these different normative approaches. The key role of the social evaluation function will be
to determine the social marginal value of the consumption by a specific individual.
2.3 Defining the social discount rate
Following the usual approach to social discounting recalled in the introduction, the compu-
tation for our general evaluation function (3) goes as follows. Suppose that individual i in
period 0 and state nature s invests $ε, providing the return $Btε to an individual j living
in period t and state s (hence j ∈ N ts).
Using the evaluation function (3), the welfare change induced by the investment at the
margin is:
W
(
· · · , cis − ε, · · · , c
j
s +Btε, · · ·
)
−W (cs).
When ε is sufficiently small, this welfare change is approximately equal to:
dF = −∂W (cs)
∂cis
ε+Btε
∂W (cs)
∂cjs
which can be expressed in present-value money as
−ε+Btε
∂W (cs)
∂cjs
∂W (cs)
∂cis
= −ε+Btε
1
(1 + r∗)t
(8)
Equation (8) implicitly defines the discount rate r∗ to be used for the evaluation of this
specific investment, given that j ∈ N ts. Observe that the investment is worth doing if and
only if Bt ≥ (1 + r
∗)t, which shows that the discount rate can equivalently be defined as the
minimal rate of return that makes the investment valuable.
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This discount rate concerns investments involving only two specific individuals, with a
specific time difference, in a specific state of the world. We shall therefore name it the
state-specific person-to-person discount rate.
Denote W is = ∂W (cs)/∂c
i
s, the social priority of individual’s i consumption in state s.
We have the following definition.
Definition 1 For all (p, c) ∈ L, for all s ∈ S, and for all i ∈ N0, j ∈ N ts, the state-specific
person-to-person discount rate from person i of generation 0 to person j of generation t in
state s, denoted δi,js , is defined by:
ln
(
1 + δi,js
)
= 1t ln
(
W is
W js
)
. (9)
In the rest of this paper, we will identify ln
(
1 + δi,js
)
and δi,js , and work with the
continuous-time formula ert rather than the discrete-time formula (1 + r)t. This simplifies
the notations and does not change anything of substance.
Realistic investments do not involve only two individuals in a specific state of the world.
In addition, the returns of the investment are rarely certain, but may vary depending on
the state of the world. Let rs denote the rate of return in state s. The periot t certainty
equivalent rate of return is then defined as the solution r to
ert =
m∑
s=1
pse
rst, (10)
and the relative period t return in state s is defined as
θts =
erst
ert . (11)
Consider an $ε investment that all individuals from the current period 0 make together,
and which is shared between them using the (state-independent) sharing rule (σi)i∈N0 , such
that
∑
i∈N0 σ
i = 1. The aggregate return is shared in period t and state s by individuals
j ∈ N ts using the sharing rule (σ
j
s)j∈Nts , such that
∑
j∈Nts
σjs = 1. Individual j in state s and
period t therefore receives σjsθtse
rtε.
If we consider an investment with certainty equivalent rate of return r, using the evalu-
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ation function (3) and assuming that ε is small enough, the welfare change induced by the
investment is
dF = −
m∑
s=1
ps
∑
i∈N0
σiW isε+
m∑
s=1
ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθ
t
se
rtW js ε. (12)
We want to define a risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate δ, suitable for discount-
ing the expected future aggregate returns of the investment. Following the methodology used
for state-specific person-to-person discount rates, this risk-and-equity adjusted social dis-
count rate δ is the rate r such that the welfare change in Equation (12) is dF = 0. This
yields the following definition.
Definition 2 The period t risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate δ for a project with
relative returns (θts)s∈S and sharing rules (σ
i)i∈N0 and (σ
j
s)j∈Nts ,s∈S is:
δ = 1t ln
( ∑m
s=1 ps
∑
i∈N0 σ
iW is∑m
s=1 ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθtsW
j
s
)
. (13)
The fact that the discount rate depends on characteristics of each particular investment
to be evaluated (shares σi, σjs, relative return θts) should not lead to the confusion that this
formula computes an internal rate of return of the investment, i.e., the discount rate that
would render this investment a matter of social indifference. Investments with the same(
σi, σjs, θts
)
parameters but different expected aggregate returns r should be evaluated with
the same social discount rate given by (13).
We can express the risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate as a generalized mean of
the state-dependent person-to-person discount rates. To do so, let wis = W
i
s/
(∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
)
denote the social priority of individual i of generation 0 in state s relative to her expected
priority.
Proposition 1 For any (p, c) ∈ L, the period t risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate
δ for a project with relative returns (θts)s∈{1,··· ,m} and sharing rules (σ
i)i∈N0 and (σ
j
s)j∈Nts ,s∈S
is given by the formula:
δ = 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
psw
i
sθ
t
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse
−δi,js t
−1 (14)
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Proof. From Equation (13), we have:
δ = 1t ln
( ∑m
s=1 ps
∑
i∈N0 σ
iW is∑m
s=1 ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθtsW
j
s
)
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑m
s=1 psW
i
s∑m
s=1 ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθtsW
j
s

= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
psθ
t
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjs
e−δ
i,j
s tW is∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
−1
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
psw
i
sθ
t
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse
−δi,js t
−1 ,
the penultimate step using the fact that, by Definition 1, W js = e−δ
i,j
s tW is .
If wis and θ
t
s are not uniform across states of the world, the formula in Proposition 1 is
not just a generalized mean of the δi,js . When all δ
i,j
s are identical (= δ∗) across individuals
and states, the formula becomes
δ = δ∗ + 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
(
m∑
s=1
psw
i
sθ
t
s
)−1 ,
so that the discount rate is lower than δ∗ if the investment has greater returns in the states
in which investors (or, equivalently, beneficiaries, since a constant δi,js means that their
priorities are perfectly correlated) have greater priority, as measured by wis. In the next
sections we provide a more transparent analysis of this formula.
In all the above formulas, a key variable is the social priority of individuals’ consump-
tions. The normative choice of function W will be crucial in determining this value.
For instance, in the well-known Total Utilitarian case defined in Equation (4), this value
is given by the marginal utility of consumption W is = u
′(cis). This is also the case for
the Critical-Level Utilitarian criterion (5), so that the critical level does not affect social
discounting in that case.2 In both cases, wis = u
′(cis)/(
∑m
s′=1 ps′u
′(cis′)), so that w
i
s = 1 when
there is no uncertainty about first period consumption, which further simplifies Equation
(14).
2The critical level may however affect the choice of the optimal policy, as shown in Millner (2013).
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This simple identity between the marginal utility of consumption and social priority is
no longer the case for the more general EDE criterion (6). Indeed, then,
W is = u
′(cis) φ
′
(
u(cis)
) (
ns φ
′
(
EDE(cs)
))−1
, (15)
where EDE(cs) = φ
−1
(
1
ns
∑
i∈Ns
φ
(
u(cis)
))
. This expression shows that the social priority
of an individual may depend on at least three factors in addition to the marginal utility of
consumption: a) inequality aversion represented by an additional equity weight to ensure
welfare (rather than consumption) equality; b) population size; c) global welfare in the whole
population (including all present and future people).
3 Risk on the returns, systematic risk and population risk
The literature studying the impact of risk on the social discount rate generally distinguishes
two forms of the risk. One is the systematic risk that affects the baseline scenario (aggre-
gate consumption path) under consideration. The other is the risk on the returns of the
investment. A third impact has been studied by a smaller strand of the literature: the risk
on the existence of future generations. It is briefly tackled in the Stern report (Stern, 2006,
Appendix to Chapter 1), following the seminal contribution by Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
Bommier and Zuber (2008), Asheim and Zuber (2014), and Fleurbaey and Zuber (2014) are
recents contributions addressing this kind of risk.
In this section, we show how the three aspects of risk enter the formula for the social
discount rate in our more general framework. More precisely, we separate three terms. A
first term is the probability of the existence of future generations. A second term is the
weighted social priority (weighted by the sharing rule), which represents the systematic
risk: unfavorable states of the world have a higher social priority. The third term involves
the returns of the investment.
To describe how these three terms enter the formula for the social discount rate, we need
to introduce some additional notation. For two variables xs and ys, expected value and
covariance are denoted E(x) =
∑m
s=1 psxs and cov(xs, ys) =
∑m
s=1 ps(xs−E(x))(ys−E(y)).
For any j ∈ N, her probability of existence is pj =
∑
s:j∈Ns
ps, and the expected value
and covariance conditional on her existence are Ej(x) =
∑
s:j∈Ns
ps
pj
xs and cov
j(x, y) =
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.15
discounting, risk and inequality 12
∑
s:j∈Ns
ps
pj
(xs − E
j(x))(ys − E
j(y)).
Proposition 2 For any (p, c) ∈ L, the period t risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate
δ for a project with relative returns (θts)s∈S and sharing rules (σ
i)i∈N0 and (σ
j
s)j∈Nts ,s∈S is
given by the formula:
δ = 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑
j∈Nt
pj E
j(σjW j)
E(W i)
Ej(θt)
(
1 + covj
(
θt
Ej(θt)
, σ
jW j
Ej(σjW j)
))−1 (16)
Proof. From Equation (13), we have:
δ = 1t ln
( ∑m
s=1 ps
∑
i∈N0 σ
iW is∑m
s=1 ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθtsW
j
s
)
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 1
E(W i)
m∑
s=1
ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθ
t
sW
j
s
−1
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑
j∈Nt
1
E(W i)
∑
s:j∈Ns
psθ
t
sσ
j
sW
j
s
−1
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑
j∈Nt
pjEj(θt)E
j(σjW j)
E(W i)
∑
s:j∈Ns
ps
pj
θts
Ej(θt)
σjsW
j
s
Ej(σjW j)
−1
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑
j∈Nt
pjEj(θt)E
j(σjW j)
E(W i)
Ej
(
θt
Ej(θt)
σjW j
Ej(σjW j)
)−1
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑
j∈Nt
pj E
j(σjW j)
E(W i)
Ej(θt)
(
1 + covj
(
θt
Ej(θt)
, σ
jW j
Ej(σjW j)
))−1 ,
where the last step invokes Ej(xy) = Ej(x)Ej(y) + covj(x, y).
It is possible to distinguish three terms in formula (16). First the probability of the
existence of the future individual j, pj . Second, the relative priority of individual j weighted
by her share of the benefits, E
j(σjW j)
E(W i)
. This term implicitly captures the systematic risk,
which will determine whether future people are more or less well-off. It may also include
the risk on population, for the relative priority of individual j may depend on population
size, as exemplified in Equation (15). Third, a term involving the risk on the returns,
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Ej(θt)
(
1 + covj
(
θt
Ej(θt)
, σ
jW j
Ej(σjW j)
))
, which itself is decomposed into a term of association
between j’s existence and the relative return, Ej(θt), and a term of association between j’s
social priority and the relative return.
If one abstracts from the issue of the existence of future generations, formula (16) is
related to existing formulas in the case where there is both a systematic risk on aggregate
consumption and a risk on the returns. For instance, with a Discounted Utilitarian evalua-
tion function with only one individual per generation, Gollier (2012, Chap. 12) proposes to
evaluate future cash flows by first computing a certainty equivalent of the risky cash flow,
and then discounting it using a discount rate for risk-free investment. To follow his notation,
considering the criterion
∞∑
t=0
e−δtu
(
ct
)
,
and the risky cash flow is a random variable Bts, and the future cash flows should be evaluated
using the formula e−rtF t, where r = δ − 1t ln
(
Eu′(ct)
Eu′(c0)
)
and F t =
EBtu′(ct)
Eu′(ct) .
If one would like to discount the cash flows instead of the certainty equivalent cash
flows, and following Gollier’s line of argument, one could also use the formula e−r˜tEBt,
where r˜ = δ − 1t ln
(
Eu′(ct)
Eu′(c0)
)
− 1t ln
(
Eθtu′(ct)
Eu′(ct)
)
and θts =
Bts
EBt . Realizing that u
′(cis) is the
same as W is in the Utilitarian special case, it is clear that formula (16) extends Gollier’s
formula. The difference is therefore that our formula is used to directly discount expected
cash flows, rather than the certainty-equivalent of the cash-flow.
It is possible to follow this route to define a risk-adjusted person-to-person discount rate.
Definition 3 For any (p, c) ∈ L, and for any i ∈ N0, j ∈ N ts, the risk-adjusted person-to-
person discount rate from person i to person j, denoted δ˜i,j, is:
δ˜i,j = −1t ln
(
pj
)
− 1t ln
(
EjW j
EiW i
)
− 1t ln
(
1 + covj
(
θt, W
j
EjW j
))
. (17)
When there is no uncertainty about the composition of the population and the shar-
ing rule in period t, the risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate can be written as a
generalized mean of the risk-adjusted person to person discount rates:
Corollary 1 Assume that (p, c) ∈ L is such that, for all s ∈ S, N ts 6= ∅, N
t
s = N
t
a and
σjs = σ
j
a for all j ∈ N ta. The period t risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate δ is given
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by the formula:
δ = 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
∑
j∈Nta
σjae
−δ˜i,jt
−1 (18)
This formula generalizes equations (21) and (24) in Fleurbaey and Zuber (2013).
One key factor in Equation (16) is the covariance between the relative return and the
relative priority of future people in different states of the world. A positive covariance will
decrease the discount rate, and therefore increase the value of future costs and benefits. To
understand what sign we can expect for this term, we now discuss a simple example.
Example 1: Returns are proportional to the growth rate of consumption. A
common assumption in the capital asset pricing model literature is that the cash flow of
the investment project and aggregate income are positively stochastically dependent (See
for instance Gollier, 2012, Chap. 12). Let us therefore assume that the returns of the
investment project and the growth rate of consumption are related by the equation:
r = α+ βg + ǫ
where r is the rate of return of the investment, g is the growth rate of consumption and ǫ is
a random variable, which is independent of growth. The parameter β is know in the finance
literature as the “beta” of the project, which is an important feature of standard capital
asset pricing formulae. It is know to be related to the covariance between the systematic
risk on consumption and the risk on returns.
To obtain simple and clear-cut results, we assume a very persistent growth pattern. The
consumption growth rate g is determined once for all at the initial period, and it is supposed
to be a Gaussian random variable with mean µg and standard deviation σg. We also assume
that ǫ is a Gaussian random variable with mean µe and standard deviation σe, and which is
independent of g.3 Hence consumption in period t is ct = e
gtc0 and the cash flows from the
investment are Bts = e
rtI0 = e
(α+βg+ǫ)tI0 where I0 is the investment in the initial period.
The relative return in period t is θt = B
t
s
EBts
.
3It is straightforward to extend our results to the case were ǫ is not Gaussian and may not be persistent
(a different random variable would be drawn each period). Since this plays no role in the analysis, we do
not consider such complications.
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Throughout the example, we assume that there are N identical individuals in each
generation and no uncertainty on the planning horizon (all generations exist until period
T > t). We consider two social evaluation functions: the Total Utilitarian criterion (4) and
the Equally Distributed Equivalent criterion (6).
The Utilitarian case: Assume that u is a power function u(c) = c1−η/(1− η). Then, for
j ∈ N t: W js = (c
j
s)−η and
EjW j
EiW i
= Ee−ηgt.
The random variable −ηgt is normally distributed with mean −ηµgt and variance η
2σ2gt
2.
It known that EeX = e(E(X)+0.5V (X)) when X is normally distributed with mean E(X) and
variance V (X), so that4
−1t ln
(
EjW j
EiW i
)
= ηµg − 0.5η
2σ2gt.
Similarly, we have EBts = e
rtI0 = e
(α+βµg+µe)t+0.5(β2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2
I0, because the random
variable rt is normally distributed with mean (α + βµg + µe)t and variance (β
2σ2g + σ
2
e)t
2.
Hence
E
(
θt W
j
E(W j)
)
= E
(
Bts
E(Rts)
W j
E(W j)
)
=
EertI0e
−ηgtc−η0
E(Bts)E(W
j)
=
Ee(α+(β−η)g+ε)t
e(α+βµg+µe)t+0.5(β
2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2
e−ηµgt+0.5η
2σ2gt
2 .
Given our assumptions (α + (β − η)g + ǫ)t is normally distributed with mean (α + (β −
η)µg + µe)t and variance ((β − η)
2σ2g + σ
2
e)t
2, so that,
E
(
θt W
j
E(W j)
)
=
e(α+(β−η)µg+µe)t+0.5((β−η)
2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2
e(α+βµg+µe)t+0.5(β
2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2
e−ηµgt+0.5η
2σ2gt
2 ,
and
−1t ln
(
1 + covj
(
θt, W
j
EjW j
))
= −1t ln
(
E
(
θt W
j
EjW j
))
= βησ2gt.
The risk on the returns of the investment is positively associated with the systematic
risk on consumption growth, which increases the social discount rate.
The Equally Distributed Equivalent case: Consider the Equally Distributed Equivalent
4We therefore obtain a term structure of the risk-free discount rate, which is decreasing with time. This
is not surprising given the strong persistence in the growth process. Our example is extreme in the sense
that the discount rate tends to minus infinity when times goes towards infinity. We do not claim that the
underlying growth process is realistic: it is used to facilitate the exposition of our example.
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criterion (6), and assume that u is a power function, i.e., u(c) = c1−η/(1 − η), where
0 < η < 1, and φ(v) = ln(v). Then we have, for j ∈ N t:
W js = (T + 1)
−1(cjs)
−1 exp
(
1−η
T+1
T∑
τ=0
ln(cτs)
)
,
where cτs = c
k
s for k ∈ N
τ .
Hence, if j ∈ N t, W js = (T + 1)−1c
−1
0 e
−gt exp( 1−ηT+1
∑T
τ=0 gτ), and, using
∑T
τ=0 τ =
T (T + 1)/2,
EjW j
EiW i
=
E(T+1)−1c−10 e
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
g
E(T+1)−1c−10 e
(
(1−η)T
2
)
g
= e
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
µg+0.5
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)2
σ2g
e
(
(1−η)T
2
)
µg+0.5
(
(1−η)T
2
)2
σ2g
,
because the random variable
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
)
g is normally distributed with mean
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
)
µg
and variance
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
)2
σ2g and the random variable
(
(1−η)T
2
)
g is normally distributed
with mean
(
(1−η)T
2
)
µg and variance
(
(1−η)T
2
)2
σ2g . One therefore obtains
−1t ln
(
EjW j
EiW i
)
= µg − 0.5σ
2
gt+
(1−η)T
2 σ
2
g .
As before, we can compute
E
(
θt W
j
E(W j)
)
= E
(
Bts
E(Bts)
W j
E(W j)
)
=
EertI0(T + 1)
−1c−10 e
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
g
E(Bts)E(W
j)
=
Ee
(α+ǫ)t+
(
βt+
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
))
g
e(α+βµg+µe)t+0.5(β
2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2
e
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
µg+0.5
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)2
σ2g
.
The random variable (α + ǫ)t +
(
βt+
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
))
g is normally distributed with mean
αt+µet+
(
β +
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
))
µg and variance σ
2
e t
2+
(
βt+
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
))2
σ2g , which implies
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that:
E
(
θt W
j
E(W j)
)
=
e
(α+βµg+µe)t+
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
µg+0.5(β2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2+0.5
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)2
σ2g+β
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
t2σ2g
e(α+βµg+µe)t+0.5(β
2σ2g+σ
2
e)t
2
e
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)
µg+0.5
(
(1−η)T
2 −t
)2
σ2g
,
and
−1t ln
(
1 + covj
(
θt, W
j
EW j
))
= −1t ln
(
E
(
θt W
j
E(W j)
))
= −β
(
(1−η)T
2 − t
)
σ2gt.
The key result here is that, when (1−η)T2 > t that is when the planning horizon is
sufficiently large compared to the date at which the cash flows are discounted, we can obtain
that the covariance term as a negative impact on social discounting. This is in contrast with
the result obtained for the Utilitarian case.
The reason for this different result is that individuals in period t have a higher W j in
the favorable scenarios (when growth is large) than in the bad scenarios. Since returns are
also higher in favorable scenarios, the covariance between social priority and the risk on the
returns of the investment. The reason why social priority is high in good state is because it
does not depend only on marginal utility but also on the relative ranking of individuals in
their state of the world. When growth is positive, generation t is relatively less well-off when
there are many future generations. On the contrary, generation t is relatively better-off
when all future generations will be poorer in the bad scenario.
The systematic risk on aggregate consumption and the risk on the returns are well-known
and studied in the literature on social discounting (and in the related finance literature on
valuing uncertain projects). This is not the case of the risk on population size which has only
received limited attention yet. The main contributions addressing the issue limit themselves
to noticing that the hazard rate of the risk can be used to pinpoint the value of a parameter
known as the rate of pure time preference (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Stern, 2006).
As is clear from Equation (16), the relative probability of the existence of future genera-
tions is indeed one aspect of the risk on the population size that would enter the discounting
formula for any social evaluation function. But it is not the only way population size matters
if one goes beyond the standard Total Utilitarian case, as is demonstrated by the following
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example.
Example 2: The risk on population size. Assume that there is no risk on consumption
or the returns of the investment. We consider a case in which people of a given generation
t are all equal and consume ct. The only risk is on the existence of the future generations.
Each period, with probability p the world survives to the next period, and with probability
1− p the human species (and any species relevant for welfare) disappears.5
We also consider that potential population (i.e. absent the extinction risk) grows at a
given exponential rate n. Hence denoting nt = |N t|, we have nt+1 = (1 + n)nt. With prob-
ability (1− p)pt, the population size is therefore exactly
∑τ
τ=1 n
0(1 + n)t = n0 (1+n)
t+1−1
n =
(1 + n)t
(
n0(1+n)
n −
n0
n(1+n)t
)
. Generation t exists with probability pt.
Consider first the Total Utilitarian criterion (4). Then, for any j ∈ N t: EjW js = u′
(
ct
)
and, using formulas (17) and (18) we obtain:
δ = − ln p−
1
t
ln
(
u′(ct)
u′(c0)
)
,
where only the hazard rate of the extinction risk enters the discounting formula.
If we now turn to the Average Utilitarian criterion (i.e. criterion (6) with φ an affine
function), we obtain that for any j ∈ N t:
EjW js = u
′
(
ct
) ∞∑
τ=t
(1− p)pτ−t(1 + n)−τ
(
n0(1 + n)
n
−
n0
n(1 + n)τ
)−1
= u′
(
ct
)
(1 + n)−t
∞∑
τ=0
(1− p)pτ (1 + n)−τ
(
n0(1 + n)
n
−
n0
n(1 + n)τ+t
)−1
.
Using formulas (17) and (18) we obtain:
δ˜i,j = − ln p+ ln(1 + n)−
1
t
ln
(
u′(ct)
u′(c0)
)
−
1
t
ln
∑∞τ=0 pτ (1+n)−τ(n0(1+n)n − n0n(1+n)τ+t)−1∑
∞
τ=0 p
τ (1+n)−τ
(
n0(1+n)
n
− n
0
n(1+n)τ
)−1
 .
5Note that we consider a countably infinite number of states of the world. All our formulas can be
extended to that case.
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Neglecting the last term, which is small for large values of t,6 it seems that adopting an
Average Utilitarian view, rather than a Total Utilitarian view, implies adjusting the discount
rate for population growth. In fact, compared to the Total Utilitarian formula, we have to
add up the population growth rate in the Average Utilitarian formula, which can significantly
alter the discount rate.
The example shows that important choices concerning population ethics (i.e., the crite-
rion used to assess populations of different sizes) may deeply alter the social discount rate
and therefore policy recommendations. This is not a debate that can remain unaddressed.
4 Inequality
The distribution of costs and benefits is one of the key issues in the theory of cost-benefit
analysis. The mainstream approach to the problem consists in assuming an efficient distri-
bution of the costs and benefits (or an implicit redistribution compensating those treated
unfairly), so that equity considerations can be dispensed with.
If one does not want to assume away the equity issue, the standard technique in cost-
benefit analysis consists in introducing “equity weights.” These are weights on the costs and
benefits depending on individuals’ relative welfare: the less well-off receive higher weights.
The technique has been used in the case of climate change to adjust the social cost of carbon
for equity considerations.
We propose a technique to incorporate equity considerations directly in the discount
rate. We first highlight the importance of the covariance between the individual’s relative
social priority and her share of costs and benefits. To do so, we need to introduce some
additional notation. For j ∈ N ts, w¯
j
s = W
j
s /(
1
nts
∑
k∈Nts
W ks ) is the relative social priority of
j with respect to individuals in the same generation and state of the world. We also define
Covtpop(x
t, yt) = 1nts
∑
j∈Nts
(
xj − 1nts
∑
k∈Nts
xk
)(
yj − 1nts
∑
k∈Nts
yk
)
.
Proposition 3 For any (p, c) ∈ L, the period t risk-and-equity adjusted social discount rate
6
(
n0(1+n)
n
− n
0
n(1+n)τ
)
<
(
n0(1+n)
n
− n
0
n(1+n)t+τ
)
<
n0(1+n)
n
and n0 <
(
n0(1+n)
n
− n
0
n(1+n)τ
)
, so that
1
t
ln
(
n
1+n
)
=
1
t
ln


∑
∞
τ=0 p
τ (1+n)−τ
(
n
0(1+n)
n
)
−1
∑
∞
τ=0 p
τ (1+n)−τ (n0)−1

 < 1
t
ln


∑
∞
τ=0 p
τ (1+n)−τ
(
n
0(1+n)
n
−
n
0
n(1+n)τ+t
)
−1
∑
∞
τ=0 p
τ (1+n)−τ
(
n0(1+n)
n
−
n0
n(1+n)τ
)
−1

 < 0.
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δ for a project with relative returns (θts)s∈S and sharing rules (σ
i)i∈N0 and (σ
j
s)j∈Nts ,s∈S is
given by the formula:
δ = 1t ln
 ∑ms=1 ps ( 1n0 ∑i∈N0 W is) [1 + n0Cov0pop (σ0s , w¯0s)]∑m
s=1 psθ
t
s
(
1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
W js
) [
1 + ntsCov
t
pop (σ
t
s, w¯
t
s)
]
 (19)
Proof. From Equation (13), we have:
δ = 1t ln
( ∑m
s=1 ps
∑
i∈N0 σ
iW is∑m
s=1 ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsθtsW
j
s
)
= 1t ln
( ∑m
s=1 ps
(
1
n0
∑
i∈N0 W
i
s
)
(
∑
i∈N0 σ
iw¯is)∑m
s=1 psθ
t
s
(
1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
W js
)(∑
j∈Nts
σjsw¯
j
s
)
)
= 1t ln
 ∑ms=1 ps ( 1n0 ∑i∈N0 W is) [1 + n0Cov0pop (σ0s , w¯0s)]∑m
s=1 psθ
t
s
(
1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
W js
) [
1 + ntsCov
t
pop (σ
t
s, w¯
t
s)
]
 ,
where the last step uses the fact that bk =
∑
k ak b¯ +
∑
k (ak − a¯)
(
bk − b¯
)
, letting a¯ and
b¯ denote the average values. Note that
∑
i∈N0 σ
i
s =
∑
j∈Nts
σjs = 1 and
1
n0
∑
i∈N0 w¯
i
s =
1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
w¯js = 1.
Formula (19) introduces the terms Cov0pop
(
σ0s , w¯
0
s
)
and Covtpop
(
σts, w¯
t
s
)
to take into ac-
count the equity in the distribution of costs and benefits. When costs are born by the poor
today, this will therefore tend to increase the discount rate: the investment is less valuable
because it involves increasing inequality today. But if the benefits are received by the poor
tomorrow, this will tend to decrease the discount rate: the investment is more valuable
because it will reduce inequality tomorrow.
One aspect of equity is not highlighted in formula (19): the level of inequality today
and tomorrow. It is implicitly taken into account in the average social priority of people in
generation t and state s. For most social evaluation functions, the expression 1nts
∑
j∈Nts
W js
is increasing with inequality. For instance, in the Utilitarian case, if u (c) = 11−η c
1−η and
η > 0, one obtains ∑
i
u′
(
ci
)
=
∑
i
(
ci
)−η
,
an expression that decreases when a progressive transfer is made between two agents. There-
fore formula (19) shows that increasing inequality in the future tends to lower the discount
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rate. Intuitively, a more unequal future deserves more investment from the present gen-
eration, because, other things equal, more people will be in great need of the benefits of
the investment. Note that this feature is consistent with the finding by Gollier (2010) that
economic convergence increases the social discount rate. Similarly, if we were not to use
a power utility function, we could obtain the finding by Gollier (2010) that the mere exis-
tence of inequalities (unchanged with time) increases the discount rate when the function u
exhibits decreasing and convex relative risk aversion.
The ratio 1nts
∑
j∈Njs
W js /
1
n0
∑
i∈N0 W
i
s is not simply a measure of the evolution of in-
equality because it also incorporates consumption growth (which decreases priority when it
is positive). Separating the two aspects is possible with many social evaluation functions,
as shown by the following example.
Example 3: The role of intragenerational inequality. Consider the case of a gener-
alized additive social evaluation (7), with power functions u (c) = 11−η c
1−η, for 0 < η < 1,
and φ (u) = 11−γu
1−γ , for γ > 0.7 Denote υ = η + (1 − η)γ and let c¯0 and c¯ts denote the
average consumptions in generations 0 and t, respectively. In that case,
W js = (c
j
s)
−υ ×Ψ′n(cs)
(∑
i∈Ns
(cis)
1−υ
1−υ
)
,
so that,
1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
W js = (c¯
t
s)
−υ ×
 1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
(
cjs
c¯ts
)−υ×Ψ′ns
(∑
i∈Ns
(cis)
1−υ
1−υ
)
,
The term
Eqts =
 1
nts
∑
j∈Nts
(
cjs
c¯ts
)−υ−1/υ
is a measure of equality, which is equal to 1 when the situation is perfectly equal and tends
to 0 when one individual consumes everything.
7The same reasoning would hold for u (c) = 1
1−η
c1−η, for η > 1, and φ (u) = 1
(1+γ)(1−η)
(−u)1+γ , for
γ > 0.
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In the simple situation where there is no uncertainty, one obtains
δ = 1t ln
 ( 1n0 ∑i∈N0 W i) [1 + n0Cov0pop (σ0, w¯0)](
1
nt(c)
∑
j∈Nt(c)W
j
) [
1 + ntCovtpop (σ
t, w¯t)
]

= υ × 1t ln
(
c¯t
c¯0
)
+ υ × 1t ln
(
Eqt
Eq0
)
− 1t ln
(
1 + ntCovtpop
(
σt, w¯t
)
1 + n0Cov0pop (σ
0, w¯0)
)
In this formula, the discount rate can therefore be decomposed in three terms, which all
represent one aspect of equity. The first term is related to the growth of average consumption
and accounts for intergenerational equity. The second term is related to the change in
equality within generations, and therefore accounts for intragenerational equity. The last
term measures the evolution of the covariance between relative welfare and the shares in
cost and benefits; it accounts for the equity in the distribution of costs and benefits.
5 Long-term discounting and the information needed to evaluate climate
policies
The formulas that we have presented above require a lot of information about the distri-
bution of costs and benefits, the distribution of consumption within generations and the
probability of the different states of the world. A key question is to determine which infor-
mation must be known with good accuracy to evaluate very long-term impacts of policies.
The results of this section show that, fortunately, only a small fraction of the information
is relevant in the very long term.
The following Proposition states that the most important information, for the compu-
tation of the social discount rate, is the maximum possible return of the investment, and
the maximum possible return net of a specific person-to-person discount. We can dispense
with the distribution shares of impacts (and of contributions) and with the probabilities of
the different states.
Proposition 4 Consider (p, c) ∈ L such that for all t ∈ N, for all s ∈ S, for all j ∈ N ts,
σjs ≥ σ0 for some σ0 > 0. When t→∞, the period t risk-and-equity adjusted social discount
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rate δ satisfies the formula:
δ = max
s∈S
rs − min
i∈N0
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
+O(1/t) (20)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In Equation (20), the expression O(1/t) means that there is A > 0 such that
∣∣∣∣δ − (maxs∈S rs − mini∈N0 maxs∈S,j∈Nts (rs − δi,js )
)∣∣∣∣ < A/t
for t high enough. Therefore this approximation result is compatible with the fact that the
distribution of rs and δ
i,j
s may vary with time (and even diverge).
Obviously, when t goes to infinity, the discount rate converges not just to the formula but
to the limit of the formula if there is one. For instance, if the growth rate of consumption
tends to zero in the very long run, the person-to-person discount rate δi,js tends to zero for
all i, j, and the limit discount rate is zero.
In order to understand which individuals i ∈ N0 and j ∈ N t are relevant in the com-
putation of mini∈N0 maxs∈S maxj∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
, first observe that for a given i and s, the
greatest rs − δ
i,j
s is obtained for j having the lowest δ
i,j
s , i.e., the greatest W
j
s . That will be
the most disadvantaged individual in state s.
Now, assume that for every given s and j, the maximum value of δi,js is obtained for
the same individual i, i.e., for every s the same i has the greatest W is . Although in general
the individual i with the greatest W is might depend on s, it is quite natural, when there
is no risk on generation 0, that no such dependence occurs. For instance, when the social
evaluation function takes the generalized additive form (7), one simply has
δi,js =
1
t ln
(
u′(ci)φ′◦u(ci)
u′(cjs)φ′◦u(c
j
s)
)
,
so that the individual i with the greatest W is is the individual with the lowest consumption.
When the same individual i has the greatest W is for all s (and obviously for all j as well),
one has
min
i∈N0
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
= max
s∈S
(
rs −max
i∈N0
min
j∈Nts
δi,js
)
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To compute the long-term discount rate, one can then proceed as follows. For any given
s ∈ S, focus on the worst-off-to-worst-off discount rate, and compute a net return on the
investment using this discount rate —the net return being the difference between the return
and the discount rate. Then pick the state s ∈ S in which this net return is maximal. The
difference between the maximum return and the maximum net return is the social discount
rate.
In case the highest net return rs − δijs is obtained in the state s
∗ where rs is greatest,
the final formula is simply
max
i∈N0
min
j∈Nt
s∗
δi,js∗ .
This is so when high returns occur in states where the worst-off of the future generations
live in the deepest poverty, a situation that may be the case for climate change. If climate
change affects growth and the climate damages are higher in high-temperature scenarios, an
investment to reduce climate damages may be more profitable in bad states where future
generations are poor.
But if greatest net return rs − δ
i,j
s is obtained for a low rs, because the returns are cor-
related with the well-being of j, then the discount rate is greater than maxi∈N0 minj∈Nts δ
i,j
s
for any state. This means that investments that pay when the future worst-off are especially
badly-off should be evaluated with a lower discount rate than investments paying when the
future worst-off are less badly-off. As an extreme example, consider a case in which there
is no inequality within generations and in every state the discount rate is an increasing
function of the rate of return, with a coefficient greater than one (as in a Ramsey formula
with elasticity of utility greater than one, and a growth rate equal to the rate of return on
investments). Then the maximum of rs− δ
i,j
s is obtained for the lowest rs, and the discount
rate is then equal to maxs∈S rs−mins∈S rs+mins∈S δ
i,j
s , where i and j are any representative
agents of their generation.
Formula (20) also provides results which are reminiscent of Gollier’s (2004) and Weitz-
man’s (1998) analyses of the long-run discount rate, in special cases. When the rate of return
on the investment is, in every state of the world, equal to the discount rate (e.g., because
of a market equilibrium condition, as in Gollier and Weitzman (2010), or when there is no
inequality within generations, the rate of return is the same as the growth rate, and utility
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is logarithmic), then the second term vanishes and the discount rate on expected returns
is, in the limit, the maximum possible rate of return, as in Gollier (2004). In contrast, if
there is no uncertainty about the rate of return, then rs disappears from the formula, and in
absence of inequality within generations, it simplifies into mins∈S δ
i,j
s , where i and j are any
representative agents of their generation. This is similar to Weitzman’s (1998) perspective
on the issue.8
Although Equation (20) sheds light on what matters in the very long run, it does not
imply that the approximation formula can be applied without precautions. In particular,
the approximation for the discount rate may be reasonable only in the very long run, as the
convergence of the brackets to zero may be slow in some cases. The error on the discount
rate made by using the approximation formula is bounded by A/t, for
A = max

∣∣∣∣ln( min
i∈N0
σi
)
+ ln
(
min
s∈S
ps
)∣∣∣∣ , ∑
i∈N0
σi/σ0
mins∈S pswis
 ,
which varies like (1/t) ln 10k ≈ 2.3k/t, where k may be as high as 12 (in particular, σ0 may be
of the order of magnitude of a billionth, and the lowest ps of the order of a percentage point).
One then needs to go beyond t = 3000 in order to make the error go below one percentage
point. The large uncertainty about the impact of our current actions on such remote times
may render the approximation useless, as the relevant consequences for decision-making
may be in the medium-term, before the approximation is correct. On the other hand, the
following example shows that one can find cases for which the convergence happens within
a few hundred years.
Example 4: The long run discount rate. Assume that we use a Total Utilitarian social
welfare function, and that u is a power function u(c) = −c−1.
Consider a society composed of two groups of people: the rich and the poor. The
population is constant, the two groups have the same size in all periods, and costs and
8Gollier’s and Weitzman’s arguments were not based on a social welfare function. Gollier (2004) noted
that, when t → ∞, the expected future net value of an investment is driven by the greatest rate of return,
whereas Weitzman (1998) observed that the expected present value of an investment is driven by the lowest
discount rate when there is uncertainty about growth. Neither the expected future value nor the expected
present value are generally the relevant criterion in our social welfare function approach.
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benefits are shared on a per capita basis. In period 0, the rich consume five times as much
as the poor.
The society faces the following risk. With probability 0.9 (a good state of nature), the
consumption of the rich grows at a 1.5% rate, and the consumption of the poor grows at a
1.3% rate. With probability 0.1 (a bad state), the consumption stays constant for both the
rich and the poor.
We consider three kinds of investments. A first kind of investment (Investment 1) only
yields a return in the bad state of the world. A second kind of investment (Investment 2)
yields a higher return in the bad state, but still has a positive return in the good state: the
difference between the two rates of return is 1%. A last kind of investment (Investment 3)
yields the same return in the two states.
Time mini,j,s δ
i,j
s maxi,j,s δ
i,j
s δ¯ δ1 δ2 δ3
50 -0.064 0.094 0.000 0.000 -0.019 0.021
100 -0.032 0.062 0.000 0.000 -0.012 0.018
200 -0.016 0.046 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.011
500 -0.006 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
Table 1: Long-run convergence of the social discount rate
Table 1 reports the maximum and minimum person-to-person discount rates, the approx-
imate formula δ¯ = maxs∈S rs − mini∈N0 maxs∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
, and the correct discount
rate δk, k = 1, 2, 3, for these different kinds of investments for different time horizons.
In all cases presented above, the error of Approximation (20) is less than 0.5 percentage
points after 500 years. The approximation is almost immediately correct for Investment 1,
where only the bad state of the world matters. For the other two investments, the error is
around 2 percentage point for a 100 years horizon, and 1 percentage point for a 200 years
horizon. So, while the mistake can be substantial for shorter term impacts, it is limited for
impacts at reasonably long horizon.
Approximation (20) is relevant for the computation of the social discount rate. But the
important term for the computation of the net present value of an investment is e(r−δ)t,
for which this approximation result is not very useful, as errors on the discount rate get
compounded with t. Let us therefore examine how one can approximate e(r−δ)t for large
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values of t. To do so, we introduce the following condition.
Condition (C) For (p, c) ∈ L, define the following sets:
J is,t =
{
j ∈ N ts | rs − δ
i,j
s = max
j′∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j′
s
)}
,
Sit =
{
s ∈ S | max
j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
= max
s′∈S,j′∈Nts
(
rs′ − δ
i,j′
s′
)}
,
It =
{
i ∈ N0 | max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
= min
i′∈N0
max
s′∈S,j′∈Nts
(
rs′ − δ
i′,j′
s′
)}
.
A lottery (p, c) ∈ L satisfies Condition (C) if there exists α > 0 such that:
min
i/∈It
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
− min
i∈N0
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
> α for all t ∈ N,
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
− max
s/∈Sit ,j∈N
t
s
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
> α for all t ∈ N, i ∈ N0,
max
j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
− max
j /∈Jis,t
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
> α for all t ∈ N, i ∈ N0, s ∈ S.
We say that a function f(t) is o (1/t) if for all A > 0, |f (t)| < A/t for t high enough.
Following a line of reasoning similar to the one used in Proposition 4, we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 5 Consider a lottery (p, c) ∈ L satisfying Condition (C). Assume also that
there exists σ0 > 0 such that σ
j
s ≥ σ0 for all t ∈ N, all s ∈ S, all j ∈ N
t
s. Then, when
t→∞, the present value of the return at t satisfies the formula:
e(r−δ)t =
(
1 + o (1/t)
)∑
i∈It
σi
∑
s∈Sit
psw
i
s
∑
j∈Jis,t
σjs

−1
−1
e
(
min
i∈N0 maxs∈S,j∈Nts
(rs−δ
i,j
s )
)
t
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
What is interesting about this second result is that it restores a role for shares and
probabilities in the approximation. But it also confirms the importance of the expression
min
i∈N0
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(rs − δ
i,j
s ).
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It should be clear that this analysis leads us very far from the usual practice of taking
discount rates based on average situations and ordinary market conditions.
6 Extensions
6.1 Overlapping generations
Until now, we have considered that individuals lived for only one period, or alternatively
that the utility of an individual in different periods is considered separately in the social
evaluation. Of course, individuals live for several periods, and it arguably makes sense
normatively that the social evaluation takes into account lifetime utility (Broome 2004).
Considering people living for several periods implies considering an overlapping generation
framework. It will also reintroduce and clarify the role of individuals’ consumption discount
rate in the social evaluation.
In this section, we slightly alter the framework to introduce overlapping generations.9
We assume that individuals live for A periods.10 Hence, alternatives are now elements of
C =
⋃
N⊂N\∅
∏
i∈N R
A
+. For any c ∈ C, as before, we let N(c) be the set of individuals alive
in the alternative and n(c) = |N (c)| be the number of individuals in the alternative. For
any c ∈ C and i ∈ N(c), ci = (ci1, · · · , ciA) is the consumption stream of individual i in
alternative c. For any a ∈ {1, · · · , A}, cia is therefore the consumption of individual i at age
a.
We assume that there exists a partition of N into subsets N t containing the potential
individuals of generation t ∈ N0 ∪ {1−A, · · · ,−1}. The ‘generation’ of an individual is the
first period of his existence.11 Hence, individual i ∈ N t lives in periods t, · · · , t+A−1 when
he exists, and we let G(i) = t denote his generation’s name. For τ = G(i), · · · , G(i)+A−1,
we also let aiτ = τ + 1 − G(i) denote the age of individual i in period τ . We restrict
attention to C = {c ∈ C | ∪0τ=1−AN
τ ⊂ N(c)}. The currently existing people are present in
9Our results therefore complement those by Dasgupta and Maskin presented in Dasgupta (2012, Section
6). In his main results, Dasgupta (2012) considers a dynasty of successive (non overlapping) generations,
where the current generation uses a utilitarian criterion. The non overlapping structure may induce cycles
in the discount rates, while the undiscounted utilitarian criterion implies no pure time discounting. Our
framework is more general in the sense that we do not commit to Utilitarian ethics (while we do not exclude
it). Our overlapping structure would in general not generate cycles in the social discount rate.
10Extension to the case where individuals have different lengths of life is straightforward but much more
involved notationally.
11That is why we have to include generations {1−A, · · · ,−1} who still live in period 0.
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all alternatives.
We also need to know which individuals live in any given period in a given alternative.
We therefore change the notation N t(c), and denote N t(c) =
(
∪tτ=t−A+1N
t
)
∩N(c). N t(c)
is therefore the set of all individuals living in period t in alternative c. Accordingly, we
denote nt(c) = |N t(c)| the number of all individuals living in period t in alternative c. All
other pieces of notation remain the same.
We also have to modify the specification of the social welfare function. We assume that
for each potential individual i ∈ N there exists a utility function ui which is used in the
social evaluation to assess his welfare given a specific consumption stream ci. Therefore, we
add the restriction (satisfied by all specific criteria introduced in Section 2.2) that, for any
cs ∈ C:
W (cs) = Fns
((
ui(cis)
)
i∈Ns
)
.
Denoting uias = ∂u
i(cis)/∂c
ia
s , F
i
s = ∂F/∂u
i
s and W
it
s = ∂W (cs)/∂c
iait
s , we obtain:
W its = u
iaitF is =
uia
it
s
ui1s
ui1s F
i
s .
The ratio uia
it
s /u
i1
s is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at age a
it
and consumption at age 1 for individual i. Hence dias = ln
(
ui1s /u
ia
s
)
/(a − 1) is (approxi-
matively) the consumption discount rate at age a 6= 1 for individual i along a consumption
path cis (we let d
i1
s = 0).
We are now able to rewrite the state-specific person-to-person discount rate from person
i living in period 0 to person j living in period t in state s, that we denote δi,jts .12 It is
simply
δi,jts =
1
t ln
(
W i0s
W jts
)
= 1t ln
(
e−d
iai0
s (a
i0
−1)ui1s F
i
s
e−d
jajt
s (a
jt−1)uj1s F
j
s
)
= d
jajt
s (a
jt−1)−dia
i0
s (a
i0−1)
t +
t+ai0−ajt
t
1
G(j)−G(i) ln
(
ui1s F
i0
s
ujts F
jt
s
)
= d
jajt
s (a
jt−1)−dia
i0
s (a
i0−1)
t +
t+ai0−ajt
t D
i,j
s . (21)
Naming Di,js =
1
G(j)−G(i) ln
(
ui1s F
i0
s
ujts F
jt
s
)
the ‘state-specific person-to-person birth discount
12Because individuals live for more than one period, we now need to specify the period t of the future
consumption.
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rate from person i to person j’, we see that this term is prominent in the long-run. Indeed,
if consumption discount rates dias are bounded for all relevant alternatives, the first term in
Equation (21) tends to 0 when t goes to infinity. Similarly, the term t+a
i0−ajt
t goes to one.
This means that, in the long-run, the ages of the persons involved in the investment and
their consumption discount rates do not play much role. Only state-specific person-to-person
birth discount rates will matter.
On the other hand, for shorter term investments, we need to take into account individu-
als’ consumption discount rates. A simple example is of course when i = j, that is when an
individual makes an investment for his on sake. In that case, the second term in Equation
(21) disappears (by definition, Di,is = 0). Only the individual consumption discount rate
matters for this kind of investment and the society does not interfere. The individual con-
sumption discount rate is typically the kind of investment we observe in financial markets.
The information on market rates is therefore very relevant to the social discount rate for
short term investments. But they do not provide much guidance for long term investments.
Finally, remark that all our results extend to the OLG case, in particular Propositions 4
and 5. It suffices to replace the value of δi,js by the expression for δ
i,jt
s displayed in Equation
(21).
6.2 Conclusion: Beyond the discount rate
Standard cost-benefit analysis considers the impact of policy on consumption. Consumption
can be interpreted in a rather comprehensive way, including non-market goods and public
goods such as biodiversity and ecosystem services (although this implies the difficult task
of assigning a value to those goods). One ominous aspect of climate change, however, is
that it may threaten livelihood on earth, and therefore the mere existence of many future
generations (not only human, but also for other species).
It may therefore be the case that policy affects not only consumption, but also the
prospects that we face concerning the future. We may be able to change the probability of
future catastrophic events. The technique used to evaluate changes in probabilities, when
there is a risk on the existence or longevity of an individual, consists in computing the
‘value of a statistical life’ (VSL). We can extend the methodology in the case of risks on the
existence of future generations (the idea was suggested, but used in a very different way by
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Weitzman, 2009).
Suppose that the goal of a policy is to shift probability from state s to state s′ by a
small amount δ. What cost ε can be imposed on individual i who is living now, for the sake
of implementing this policy?13 The variation in social welfare is equal to
dF = δ (W (cs′)−W (cs))−
m∑
s=1
psW
i
sε,
and it is equal to zero when
ε
δ
=
W (cs′)−W (cs)∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
. (22)
The right-hand-side of the above expression defines a concept similar to VSL, that we can
name the social value of risk reduction. It determines how much the society is ready to pay
for a small reduction of the risk (represented by scenario s realizing).
It turns out that the right-hand side of Equation (22) can be reformulated using the
person-to-person discount rates, when the two states s and s′ are not too different, and in
particular when the same population Ns = Ns′ lives in the two states. In that case,
W (cs′)−W (cs)∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
≈
∑
j∈Ns
W js
(
cjs′ − c
j
s
)
∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
= W
i
s∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
∑
j∈Ns
W js
W is
(
cjs′ − c
j
s
)
= wis
∑
t
∑
j∈Nts
e−δ
i,j
s t
(
cjs′ − c
j
s
)
.
In this case, the social value of risk reduction is proportional to the discounted sum of
the consumption gains for all people in all generations. This expression is intuitive: it is
equal to the social willingness to make i pay for a 100% probability shift from s to s′.
In the case of climate change though, there are reasons to think that the marginal analysis
used in the approximation will not hold. First, we may want to shift probability from a
catastrophic scenario in which people are all deprived to a very different scenario in which
people are able to enjoy much better lives. Second, we would like to shift probability from
a catastrophic scenario in which few generations exist to a scenario in which many more
13Like before, the cost of the policy could be shared between different individuals of the current generation,
involving additional equity consideration. Here we leave these complications aside for the sake of simplicity.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.15
discounting, risk and inequality 32
generations exist. This involves comparing populations of different sizes, and therefore
making hard ethical decisions concerning the value of additional lives.
Consider for instance the critical level utilitarian criterion (5). Using this criterion, so
that W is = u
′(cis), and assuming that Ns ⊂ Ns′ , we obtain:
W (cs′)−W (cs)∑m
s=1 psW
i
s
=
∑
j∈Ns
u(cj
s′
)−u(cjs)
u′(cis)
+
∑
j∈Ns′\Ns
u(cj
s′
)−u¯
u′(cis)
≈
∑
t
∑
j∈Nts
e−δ
i,j
s t
(
cjs′ − c
j
s
)
+
∑
j∈Nt
s′
\Nts
u(cj
s′
)−u¯
u′(cis)
 .
The new expression crucially depends on the critical level u¯. If we set high standards for
the future, it may be the case that the second term in the expression is negative, because we
are not able to both increase the survival of humanity and keep high standards of living. If
on the contrary u¯ is rather low, the social value of catastrophic risk reduction may be very
high, suggesting an additional (and perhaps more powerful) reason why climate policies are
socially valuable.
In any case, the reasoning suggests that we must go beyond traditional cost-benefit
analysis valuing future aggregate consumption benefits using a social discount rate. Policies
devoted to mitigating the risk of climate change typically modify the probabilities of various
scenarios and change the level of consumption for various subgroups of the population in
the scenarios. Hence, trying to convert the costs and benefits of such a policy into monetary
amounts and comparing the corresponding total rate of return to a single macroeconomic
benchmark in the form of a discount rate may be at best quite roundabout and at worst
very misleading.
References
Anthoff, D., Hepburn, C., Tol R.S.J. (2009). “Equity Weighting and the Marginal Damage Costs of
Climate Change”, Ecological Economics, 68, 836-849.
Arrhenius, G. (2012). Population Ethics – The Challenge of Future Generations. Forthcoming.
Asheim, G.B., Zuber, S. (2014). “Probability-adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism”, mimeo.
Azar, C. (1999). “Weight Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change”, Environmental and
Resource Economics, 13, 249-268.
Azar, C., Sterner, T. (1996). “Discounting and Distributional Considerations in the Context of Global
Warming”, Ecological Economics, 19, 169-184.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.15
discounting, risk and inequality 33
Bommier, A., Zuber, S. (2008). “Can preferences for catastrophe avoidance reconcile social discount-
ing with intergenerational equity?”, Social Choice and Welfare, 31, 415-434.
Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D. (1984). “Social criteria for evaluating population change”, Journal of
Public Economics, 25, 13–33.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D. (2005). Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare
Economics, and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Broome, J. (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dasgupta, P.A. (2008). “Discounting climate change”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 37, 141-169.
Dasgupta, P.A. (2012). “Time and the generations”, in Hahn, R.W., and Ulph, A. (Eds.) Climate
Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Thomas Schelling, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 101–130.
Dasgupta, P.A., Heal, G. (1979). Economic theory and exhaustible resources. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Fankhauser, S., Tol, R.S.J., Pearce, D.W. (1997). “The Aggregation of Climate Change Damages: a
Welfare Theoretic Approach”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 10, 249-266.
Fleurbaey, M. (2010). “Assessing risky social situations”, Journal of Political Economy, 118, 649–680.
Fleurbaey, M., Zuber, S. (2013). “Climate policies deserve a negative discount rate”, Chicago Journal
of International Law, 13, .
Fleurbaey, M., Zuber, S. (2014). “Discounting, Beyond Utilitarianism”, mimeo.
Gierlinger, J., Gollier, C. (2008). “Socially efficient discounting under ambiguity aversion”, IDEI
Working Paper 561, Toulouse.
Gollier, C. (2002). “Discounting and uncertain future”, Journal of Public Economics, 85, 149-166.
Gollier, C. (2004). “Maximizing the expected net future value as an alternative strategy to gamma
discounting”, Finance Research Letters, 1, 85-89.
Gollier, C. (2010). “Discounting, inequalities and economic convergence, CESifo Working Paper
3262, Munich.
Gollier, C. (2012). Pricing the Planet’s Future: The Economics of Discounting in an Uncertain
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gollier, C., Weitzman, M.L. (2010). “How should the distant future be discounted when discount
rates are uncertain?”, Economic Letters, 107, 350–353.
Heal, G. (2007). “Discounting: a review of the basic economics”, The University of Chicago Law
Review, 74, 59-77.
Hurka, T. (2000). “Comment on Population principles with number-dependent critical levels”, un-
published manuscript, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary.
Millner, A. (2013). “On welfare frameworks and catastrophic climate risks”, Journal of Environmen-
tal Economics and Management, 65, 310–325.
Ng, Y-K. (1989). “What should we do about future generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s theory X”,
Economics and Philosophy, 5, 235–253.
Nordhaus, W. (2007a). “Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change”, Science,
317, 201-202.
Nordhaus, W. (2007b). “A review of the Stern review of the economics of climate change”, Journal
of Economic Literature, 45, 686–702.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pearce, D.W. (2003). “The social Cost of Carbon and its Policy Implications”, Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 19, 362-384.
Ramsey, F.P. (1928). “A mathematical theory of saving”, The Economic Journal, 38, 543-559.
Stern, N. H. (2006). The Stern Review of the economics of climate change, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Traeger, C.P. (2009). “Recent developments in the intertemporal modeling of uncertainty”, Annual
Review of Resource Economics, 1, 261–286.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.15
discounting, risk and inequality 34
Weitzman, M.L. (1998). “Why the far distant future should be discounted at its lowest possible
rate”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 201-208.
Weitzman, M.L. (2007). “A review of the Stern review of the economics of climate change”, Journal
of Economic Literature, 45, 703–724.
Weitzman, M.L. (2009). “On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate
change”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 91, 1-19.
Zuber, S., Asheim, G.B. (2012), “Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian ap-
proach”, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 1572–1601.
Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 4.
From Equation (14), we have:
δ = 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
psw
i
sθ
t
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse
−δi,js t
−1
= 1t ln
(
m∑
s=1
pse
rst
)
+ 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsw
i
se
(rs−δ
i,j
s )t
−1
The first term 1t ln
(∑m
s=1 pse
rst
)
= ln
((∑m
s=1 pse
rst
)1/t)
tends to ln(emaxs rs) = maxs rs
when t tends to infinity, provided the returns (rs)s∈S do not depend on time. However, one
has to take account of the fact that the distribution of rs may change with t.
Let r¯ = maxs∈S rs and denote
X(t) = 1t ln
(
m∑
s=1
pse
rst
)
− r¯ = 1t ln
(
m∑
s=1
pse
(rs−r¯)t
)
.
One has e(rs−r¯)t ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S, so that X(t) ≤ 0. On the other hand,
m∑
s=1
pse
(rs−r¯)t =
∑
s:rs=r¯
ps +
∑
s:rs 6=r¯
pse
(rs−r¯)t ≥ min
s∈S
ps.
Therefore
1
t ln
(
min
s∈S
ps
)
≤ X(t) ≤ 0.
Denote ri = maxs,j(rs − δ
i,j
s ) and r˜ = mini∈N r
i. If the (rs − δ
i,j
s )i,j,s were independent
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of t, for a given i ∈ N0 we would have that
 m∑
s=1
ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsw
i
se
(rs−δ
i,j
s )t
1/t
tends to eri .
Here again, we must take into account that the (rs − δ
i,j
s )i,j,s may change with t. To do
so, we let
Y (t) = 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
ps
∑
j∈Nts
σjsw
i
se
(rs−δ
i,j
s )t
−1+ r˜
= 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
e(r˜−ri)t∑m
s=1 psw
i
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse(
rs−δ
i,j
s −ri)t
 .
One has e(r˜−ri)t ≤ 1,
∑
i∈N0 σie
(r˜−ri)t ≥ mini σi and
min
s∈S,j∈Nts
psw
i
sσ
j
s ≤
m∑
s=1
psw
i
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse
(rs−δi,js −ri)t ≤
m∑
s=1
psw
i
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjs = 1,
so that:
1
t ln
(
min
i∈N0
σi
)
≤ 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σie
(r˜−ri)t
 ≤ Y (t) ≤ 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi
mins,j pswisσ
j
s
 ≤ 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi/σ0
mins∈S pswis
 .
Letting O(1/t) = X(t) + Y (t), we obtain
δ = max
s∈S
rs − min
i∈N0
max
s∈S,j∈Nts
(
rs − δ
i,j
s
)
+O(1/t)
and
1
t
(
ln
(
min
i∈N0
σi
)
+ ln
(
min
s∈S
ps
))
≤ O(1/t) ≤ 1t ln
∑
i∈N0
σi/σ0
mins∈S pswis
 .
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 5.
One has
e(r−δ)t =
∑
i∈N0
σi
 m∑
s=1
psw
i
s
∑
j∈Nts
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−1−1
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For every i /∈ It, one has
e
(
min
i∈N0 maxs∈S,j∈Nts(rs−δ
i,j
s )−maxs∈S,j∈Nts(rs−δ
i,j
s )
)
t
< e−αt,
m∑
s=1
psw
i
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse
(
rs−δ
i,j
s −maxs∈S,j∈Nts(rs−δ
i,j
s )
)
t
> min
s∈S
psw
i
sσ0,
so that
0 <
∑
i/∈It
σi
e
(
min
i∈N0 maxs∈S,j∈Nts(rs−δ
i,j
s )−maxs∈S,j∈Nts(rs−δ
i,j
s )
)
t∑m
s=1 psw
i
s
∑
j∈Nts
σjse
(
rs−δ
i,j
s −maxs∈S,j∈Nts(rs−δ
i,j
s )
)
t
<
e−αt/σ0
mini∈N0,s∈S psw
i
s
.
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One has (recall that
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i
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so that
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This inequality has the form
−ae−αt <
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An expression f(t) satisfying
−
b
z
e−αt < f (t) < 2
a
mini∈I σi
e−αt
is o (1/t).
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